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RECENT DECISIONS
ADuaIRLTY-UNEAWORTH NESS-VICIOUS PROCLIVITIES OF SwiM&N UNKNOWN TO
OwNEP-Plaintiff, a seaman aboard defendant shipping company's vessel, was
assaulted and seriously injured by a fellow seaman. The two seamen had quarrelled
and plaintiff struck the assailant, knocking him down. The latter retreated to the
galley, procured a cleaver and returned to strike plaintiff over the head from behind.
In the District Court a verdict was rendered for defendant. Plaintiff appealed from
the judgment entered upon the verdict, alleging that the assailant was insane and
that his presence on board rendered the vessel unseaworthy whether or not the omers
had knowledge of his vicious tendencies. The trial judge had declined to permit
plaintiff to introduce evidence of assailant's alleged insanity unless it had come to
defendant's knowledge. On appeal, held, judgment reversed, new trial ordered. Keen
v. Oversea Tankship Corp., 194 F. 2d 515 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 96 Sup. Ct. 898
(1952).
In considering the allegation of unseaworthiness, negligence is of no concern.1
There is an ancient obligation imposed on all shipowners to break ground only with
ships which are capable of withstanding all the ordinary rigors of the sea.2 This
obligation is essentially a species of liability without fault, and is neither limited
by conceptions of negligence,3 nor is it contractual in nature, but rather sounds in
tort.4 That the warranty of seaworthiness includes a guarantee that the master and
crew are fit for their duties has long been established,5 and that it operates in favor
of seamen as well as passengers and owners of cargo may not be disputed.0 It is
the extent of this warranty to seamen-that is here in dispute.
It is well settled that a seaman may have indemnity for an injury caused by a
defect in the hull or gear, although the defect was unknown to the owner. The
case of Seas Shipping Co. v. SierackF is in point. In that case an employee was
injured when a shackle broke due to a latent defect, causing a boom and tackle to
fall on him. The court held there was no obligation on the part of the shipowner
to test the shackle and that there was therefore no negligence. Nonetheless, the
ship was held to be unseaworthy and the shipowner to be liable for injuries resulting
1. A seaman may in addition, as did the plaintiff in this case, bring an action in negli-
gence, under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, commonly knovn as the Jones Act,
41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. 688 (1946). Although the allegation of negligence was
not dealt with on appeal it would seem that there was no negligence on the part of the
owner. Liability cannot be founded on the doctrine of respondeat superior as the asault
did not appear to be committed in the course of the discharge of the assailant's duties,
nor in furtherance of the work of the employer's business, but appeared to be merely the
culmination of a personal difference. Brailas v. Shepard SS. Co, 152 F. 2d 849 (2d Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 327 U. S. 807 (1946). Nor did the owner appear to be negligent in
keeping such a man on board, since it had no actual knowledge of his vicious proclivities,
and it would appear there was no duty to acquire such knowledge. Gonzales v. United
Fruit, 193 F. 2d 479 (2d Cir. 1951).
2. The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158 (1903).
3. The Seeandbee, 102 F. 2d 577 (6th Cir. 1939).
4. Cortes, Admr. v. Baltimore Insular Line Inc., 287 U. S. 367 (2d Cir. 1932).
5. The Magdapur, 3 F. Supp. 971 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
6. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U. S. 96, 99 (1944); The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158
(1903).
7. 328 U. S. 85 (1946).
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therefrom. The Sieracki Case justifies its result on the ground that the owner is
able to distribute the loss in the shipping community which receives the service and
should bear its cost.8
The decision in the instant case has the effect of affording seamen the same
protection from fellow seamen as the decision in the Sieracki case gave from the ship
and its tackle, arguing, as did the court in the Sieracki case that the cost should
be distributed by the employer.
This holding would seem to be an extension of the rule of absolute liability as it
heretofore existed, since in prior cases in which the allegation of unseaworthiness
due to the presence of a vicious seaman was upheld, the owner had knowledge of
the tendencies in the seaman which resulted in the assault. The RolphO was such
a case and was interpreted by the trial judge in the instant case as having been
decided on the ground of knowledge by the owner. That the decision would have
been otherwise in the absence of knowledge was not decided. 10 In the recent case
of Kable v. United States" the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declined
to find any unseaworthiness due to the fact that the assailant was not found to
have been a person of vicious, pugnacious or dangerous disposition. If such disposi-
tion had been found to be present, whether the owner's knowledge of it would have
to be shown in order to support an allegation of unseaworthiness, was not decided.
These questions left unanswered by the decisions in The Rolph and the Kable cases
have been disposed of in the instant case.
The decision in the instant case would seem to impose on the owner the obliga-
tion of a virtual insurer for the actions of his crew members. In most cases it
would appear to be impossible to discover beforehand whether a prospective em-
ployee is likely to be of a vicious nature. Even if this could be discovered the
cost of the discovery might very well be overwhelming. Nonetheless, it is sub-
mitted, this decision is in harmony with the flexible and ever-expanding character
of the doctrine of seaworthiness' 2 as well as with the traditional position of the
seaman as the "ward of the admiralty". 13
It has been observed14 with foresight that the only limitation on the doctrine
8. Id. at 85, 94
9. 299 Fed. 52 (1924), cert. denied, 266 U. S. 614 (1924).
10. It is interesting to note that the then Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit cited The Rolph with apparent approval in Cain v. Alpha S.S. Corp. et al.,
35 F. 2d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1929), and that in a footnote to Koehler v. Presque-Isle Transp.
Co., 141 F. 2d 490, 492 (2d Cir. 1944) the court observed that there was no proof In the
Cain case that the marauding employee was known, or reasonably should have been known,
to be unusually belligerent. In a note in 43 H~av. L. Rav. 490 (1930) it was stated that,
since the offending officer was not notoriously brutal, liability could not be rested on any
theory of unseaworthiness in Cain v. Alpha S.S. Corp., supra.
11. 169 F. 2d 90 (2d Cir. 1948).
12. A few of the cases within this trend are: Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U. S. 96
(1944) (defective rope selected by mate when good rope was available); Carlisle Packing
Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U. S. 255 (1922) (can marked "coal oil" actually containing gaso-
line); The State of Maryland, Marshall v. Manese, 85 F. 2d 944 (4th Cir. 1936) (failure
to instruct inexperienced hand). The decisions are collected in 1 BaNEDicT, ADMIRALTY
at 255 n. 34 (6th Ed. 1940).
13. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 318 U. S. 724 (1943).




of unseaworthiness is that of judicial conscience. The ways in which the doctrine of
unseaworthiness has been used are unusual; for example where a seaman slipped on
the soapy floor of the shower and this condition was held to make the vessel unsea-
worthy.1' As admiralty's ward the seaman's relationship with his employer has
been treated to be more closely analogous to that of father and child than that
of employer and mere employee.10 Whether or not, in the light of present day
circumstances, one agrees with this concept, such a view does present a broad
foundation upon which this decision can rest.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAWV-IRETAPPING-1-NTERCEPTION OF CONVEPsATIONs BEnYrwTF
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT AS A DENIAL OF EFFECTIVE Am OF CoUNSEL.-Appelant was
convicted of copying official intelligence reports relating to espionage and counter-
espionage activities for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national
defense and with intent and reason to believe that it would be used to the injury
of the United States and to the advantage of a foreign nation, in violation of
18 U. S. C. § 793 (1950), and of wilfully and unlawfully concealing and removing
official reports from the files of the Department of Justice in violation of 18 U. S. C.
§ 2071 (1951). In support of her motion for a new trial appellant charged that
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had tapped her home and office
telephone wires and had thereby intercepted conversations between her and her
counsel both before and during her trial. The trial court denied the motion. Held,
one judge dissenting, order reversed, with a direction that a new trial be granted,
if the trial court should find that the alleged telephone interceptions occurred; the
interception of the conversations, if they occurred, deprived the accused of the
effective aid of counsel, as guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States, regardless of whether or not the interception
yielded evidence which was introduced against her. Coplon v. United States, 191 F. 2d
749 (D. C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied 342 U. S. 946 (1952).
The right of an accused in a criminal action to have the assistance of counsel for
his defense has been guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.1 It has also been held
that due process of the law under the Fifth Amendment 2 entitles a defendant in
a federal court to the effective aid of counsel 3
Effective aid of counsel has been held to require that an indigent accused be
entitled to counsel; 4 that counsel be competent;0 that counsel have adequate oppor-
tunity to prepare and to present the case; 0 and that counsel be present at all
15. Krey v. United States, 123 F. 2d 1C08 (2d Cir. 1941).
16. Jones v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 155 F. 2d 992, 1000 (3d Cir. 1946).
1. U. S. CoNsT. A END. VI, provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
2. U. S. CoNsT. Ammenf . V provides in part: "No person s-hall ... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; . . .1
3. Powell et al. v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 71 (1932); Thomas et al. v. District of
Columbia, 90 F. 2d 424, 428 (App. D. C. 1937).
4. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938).
S. Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 76 (1942); Williams v. State, 192 Ga. 247,
15 S. E. 2d 219 (1941).




stages of the proceeding. 7 An adequate opportunity to prepare and present the
case necessarily involves an opportunity to confer privately with and to receive the
advice of one's counsel; 8 the opportunity for counsel adequately to prepare the
defense; 9 and the opportunity for counsel to present the case without interference
or prejudice. 10 The majority of the court predicates its finding of a denial of the
effective aid of counsel wholly upon the fact that the accused was denied the right
to consult privately with counsel both before and during the trial.
The specific fact situation at issue has never been determined before. However,
analogous situations have arisen where a privileged conversation between an attorney
and client has been overheard either accidently or by design. Thus in United States
v. Olmstead et al." a conversation between an attorney and his client was overheard
by a federal revenue agent who tapped the client's telephone wire. It was held that
the revenue agent could testify as to the contents of the confidential conversation
overheard by him. The Olmstead case is distinguishable from the instant case since
the defendant there was neither under indictment nor being tried at the time of the
wiretapping and the provisions of the Sixth Amendment were not, therefore,
applicable.
In the instant case the majority of the court points out that the fact that the
accused had ample personal consultation with her lawyer face to face, which no
person overheard, would not eliminate the blot of unconstitutionality from the act
of intercepting other conversations since there was a denial of her right privately
to consult with counsel.
The two cases relied upon principally by the majority are Louie Yung v. Coleman12
and United States v. Venuto.13 In the f6rmer case the defendants were unable to
speak English and their counsel could consult with them only through an interpreter.
They were not allowed to have an interpreter unless there was also present an inter-
preter representing the prosecution. The court directed the prosecution to allow
the petitioners to consult privately with their counsel through an interpreter selected
by them. The Venuto case involved an order by a trial judge which prohibited
discussion between counsel and accused during an eighteen hour recess in the trial.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the conviction and granted a
new trial.
In similar cases denial of private consultation between client and attorney was
condemned where the infringement of the right occurred either through the com-
7. United States v. Venuto, 182 F. 2d 519 (3rd Cir. 1950); Snell v. United States,
174 F. 2d 580 (10th Cir. 1949).
8. Louie Yung v. Coleman, 5 F. Supp. 702 (D. Idaho 1934); People ex rel. Burgess
v. Risley, 66 How. Pr. 67 (N. Y. 1883).
9. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444 (1940); Powell et al. v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45
(1932) ; Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F. 2d 335 (6th Cir. 1938).
10. Thomas et al. v. District of Columbia, 90 F. 2d 424 (App. D. C. 1937); Downer
v. Dunaway et al., 1 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Ga. 1932).
11. 7 F. 2d 760 (W. D. Wash. 1925), aff'd, 277 V3. S. 438 (1928). In State v. Falsetta,
43 Wash. 159, 86 Pac. 168 (1906), an officer of the court heard the defendant make a
damaging admission to his counsel in the courtroom. He was permitted to testify as to
what he had heard over the defendant's objection that the communication was privileged.
The constitutional question of a denial of the effective aid of counsel was not raised.
12. 5 F. Supp. 702 (D. Idaho 1934).
13. 182 F. 2d 519 (3d Cir. 1950).
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pulsory presence of a third person14 or through deprivation of the right at some
stage of the trial or proceeding.' 5
Once effective aid of counsel has been found to be denied as in the Lotde Yitmg
and Venuto cases the courts will reverse without considering whether the accused
was damaged thereby since "the right to have the assistance of counsel is too funda-
mental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the
amount of prejudice arising from its denial"'16
The justification for the conclusion of the majority of the court that the accused
was denied her right to consult privately with her counsel lies only in defining the
right as a right to an absolutely secret and uninterrupted series of conferences. This
interpretation may be an extension of the existing law on the subject17 since the
decisions suggest that the right to consult privately with counsel is merely an
adjunct of having an adequate opportunity to prepare and present the case and,
as such, it has been held that the accused and his attorney must have sufficient
opportunity to plan their strategy alone.' 8 Lack of privacy might cause fear or
reticence by the accused in conferring freely with his counsel and might also lead
to a divulgence of trial strategy.
In the present case the accused and her counsel were apparently not aware of
the wiretapping. In the Louie Yuing case'19 the accused kmew that his statements
were being overheard and, therefore, might not have had that complete candor with
his attorney which would be necessary to a proper defense. However, in the instant
case since there was no awareness that the conversations were being overheard the
accused may have made some damaging and prejudicial statements which would aid
the government in the presentation of its case. It would be manifestly unfair in the
principal case to place the burden of proving prejudice upon the accused. Informa-
tion might have been obtained which could not be shown to have been intercepted
but which might affect the government's conduct of certain parts of the case
(e.g., some questions not to ask in cross-examination). The means of proving
prejudice are not easily within the grasp of the accused.
The situation in the instant case is distinguishable from a situation where a
14. Turner et at. v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. Rep. 627, 241 S. W. 162 (1922); State ex rel.
Tucker v. Davis et al, 9 Okl-. Crim. Rep. 94, 130 Pac. 962 (1913); Ex parle Rider,
50 Cal. App. 797, 195 Pac. 965 (1920).
15. State v. Moore, 61 Kan. 732, 60 Pac. 748 (1900); Mays v. Commonwealth, 25 Ky.
L. Rep. 646, 76 S. W. 162 (1903); People ex re. Burgess v. Risely, 66 How. Pr. 67 (N. Y.
18 3).
16. Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 76 (1942).
17. The dissenting opinion in the principal case pointed out that the motion for a
new trial failed to specify in what respect the defendant had been prejudiced by the
interceptions and submitted that the hearing before the trial court, directed by the major-
ity, should be limited to the question whether or not the defendant's right to the aid of
counsel had been actually impaired by the interceptions.
18. "... a defendant, charged with a serious crime, must not be stripped of his right
to have sufficient time to advise with counsel and prepare his defense." Powell et al. v.
Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 59 (1932). In Reliford v. State, 140 Ga. 777, 79 S. E. 1128 (1913),
defense counsel was given ten minutes to prepare and this was considered insufdent,
while in Wright v. Commonwealth, 114 Va. 872, 77 S. E. 503 (1913) the defendant was
found guilty two days after the crime and no error in the proceedings was found.
19. Louie Yung v. Coleman, 5 F. Supp. 702 (D. Idaho 1934).
1952]
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conversation was overheard accidentally as in State v. Falsetta.20 In that case the
accused and his counsel were cognizant that they were in a place where their con-
versations might be overheard and they could see who was about them. In the instant
case the parties, telephoning from private locations, often from their own homes,
had a right to feel a degree of privacy which they could not expect in a public place.
The right to counsel as provided by the Sixth Amendment has become inextricably
bound up with due process as provided by the Fifth Amendment. The act of wire-
tapping the conversations of an accused with her attorney is not only "a serious
breach of ethics", 2' but smacks of unfairness in the conduct of the action. The
tactics of the F.B.I. would tend to debilitate the effective administration of justice
and to cast suspicion upon the honesty of an accused's conviction. The circum-
stances surrounding this case gave rise to a very strong national emotional feeling
against the accused. In such a situation a federal court could not place the stamp
of approval upon tactics which are usually associated with police state procedures
and which violate the fundamental fairness in the conduct of a criminal trial which
is the very essence of due process.
CONTRACTs-AsSIGNMENTS--CLAUSE PROVIDING THAT ANY ASSIGNMENT OF CON-
TRACT OR MONEY DUE THEREUNDER SHALL BE Vom.-Defendant, a general con-
tractor, subcontracted with a painting company for the performance by the latter
of certain painting work. The subcontracts contained the following prohibitory
clause: "The assignment by the second party [subcontractor] of this contract or any
interest therein, or of any money due or to become due by reason of the terms hereof
without the written consent of the first party [defendant] shall be void." The sub-
contractor subsequently assigned certain moneys due or to become due to him under
the contracts to a bank which in turn assigned said rights to the plaintiff. No written
consent of the defendant to the assignments was obtained. The contracts were not
assigned, and no question of improper delegation of contractual duties was involved.
Plaintiff assignee sued to recover certain money allegedly due and owing for work
done by the subcontractor. On appeal from the Appellate Division which affirmed a
judgment in favor of the defendant, dismissing the complaint on a motion for sum-
mary judgment, held, judgment affirmed on the ground that the prohibitory clause is
a valid and effective restriction of the right to assign with the result that the at-
tempted assignment is void as against the obligor. Herman Alkhusen v. Caristo Con-
struction Corp., 303 N. Y. 446, 103 N. E. 2d 891 (1952).
The status of an assignee whose assignor has contracted not to assign the contract
or any interest therein or any money due thereunder has vexed the courts of this
state and of other jurisdictions. Where a contract by its terms forbids an' assign-
ment, it is a matter of interpretation of the language employed as to what is the
extent of the restriction.' As stated in Sacks v. Neptune Meter Co.2 it is one thing to
20. 43 Wash. 159, 86 Pac. 168 (1906).
21. This was the trial court's description of the act. United States v. Coplon, 91 F. Supp.
867, 870 (D. C. 1950).
1. See 2 WILUSTON, CoNTnAc'S § 422 (rev. ed. 1936); Grismore, Effect of a Restriction
on Assignment in a Contract, 31 MIcn. L. REV. 299 (1933).
2. 144 Misc. 70, 77, 258 N. Y. Supp. 254, 263 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 238 App. Dlv.
82, 263 N. Y. Supp. 462 (1st Dep't 1933).
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agree that a contract or interest therein shall not be assigned and that if assigned
no right shall vest in the assignee as against the other contracting party3 and another
that the assignor merely covenants that he will not assign. In fanchestcr et al. v.
Kendal et aL4 the prohibitory clause read in substance as follows: that the party of
the second part shall not assign or transfer his interest in the contract or any right
thereunder without the written consent of the other party. In a suit by the assignee
against the other contracting party the court held that the assignment was not void
as to the other contracting party and that the assignee was entitled to recover. In
Reisler v. Cohen,0 however, where the anti-assignment clause was couched in language
similar to that employed in the Manchester case, the court reached an opposite re-
sult, stating that the failure of the assignor to obtain written consent was fatal to
the assignee's right to recover. Although there are similar holdings in other juris-
dictions,6 the decision of the Manchester case can be said to represent the New
York law.7 If the provision against assignment is without language to the effect that
no interest shall vest in the assignee, the agreement is held to be merely a personal
covenant on the part of the assignor not to assign.8 Upon the breach of such cove-
nant, the other contracting party may recover from the assignor such damages as
he may have thereby sustained
Prior to the decision in the instant case, New York courts have stated by way
of dicta that where the language of the anti-assignment clause is clear and un-
equivocal with respect to the intent of the parties, such intent will be given
effect.' 0 Such language is present in the instant case and the court implicitly recog-
nized the distinction proffered in the Sacks case by stating that where parties agree
that any assignment shall be void a court would have to do violence to such language
in order to hold that the clause meant merely a promise not to assign. Rather the
3. See Morkel v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 163 Misc. 366, 297 N. Y. Supp. 962
(Sup. Ct. 1934); Heffernan v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 88 Misc. 93, 150 N. Y.
Supp. 644 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
4. 19 Jones & S. (51 Super. Ct.) 460 (1885), aff'd mern., 103 N.Y. 638, 8 N.E. 653 (186).
5. 67 Misc. 67, 121 N Y. Supp. 603 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
6. See Burck v. Taylor, 152 U. S. 634 (1893); Fairbanks v. Crump Irrigation Supply
Co, 108 Cal. App. 197, 292 Pac. 529 (1930); Mueller v. Northwestern University, 19S E11.
236, 63 N. E. 110 (1902); Deffenbaugh v. Foster, 40 Ind. 382 (1872).
7. State Bank v. Central Mercantile Bank, 248 N. Y. 428, 162 N. E. 475 (1928); Sacks
v. Neptune Meter Co., 144 Misc. 70, 258 N. Y. Supp. 254 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aft'd, 238 App.
Div. 82, 263 N. Y. Supp. 462 (1st Dep't 1933).
8. State Bank v. Central Mercantile Bank, 248 N. Y. 428, 162 N. E. 475 (1928); Man-
chester et al. v. Kendall et al., 19 Jones & S. (51 Super. CL) 460 (1885), ar'd mem.,
103 N. Y. 638, 8 N. E. 653 (1886); Reliable Loan and Investment Co. v. The Delgus Co.
et al., 223 App. Div. 94, 227 N. Y. Supp. 425 (1st Dep't 1928).
9. Reliable Loan and Investment Co. v. The Delgus Co. et at., 223 App. Div. 94, 95,
227 N. Y. Supp. 425, 426 (1st Dep't 1928) While the decisions refer in general terms to
the right to recover damages, it is difficult to envisage a case where the damages would
be more than nominal.
10. State Bank v. Central Mercantile Bank, 248 N. Y. 428, 162 N. E. 475 (1928); Quinn
v. Whitney, 204 N. Y. 363, 97 N. E. 724 (1912); N. Y. Bank Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank
Note Engraving & Printing Co., 180 N. Y. 280, 73 N. E. 48 (1905); Fortunato v. Patten,
147 N. Y. 277, 41 N. E. 572 (1895); Devlin v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 8 (1875). See RsrATE-
2m=az, Co-rmcrs § 151 (1932).
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court decided that the parties intended that an attempted assignment without con-
sent would be void as against the obligor. The court further found that there was
no sound reason which barred it from giving legal effect to the intent of the parties
with respect to the prohibitory provision.
"The plaintiff in the instant case contended that Section 41 of the Personal Prop-
erty Law of New York 1 requires that the prohibitory clause be denied effect. In
dismissing this contention the court stated that because the statute provides that
a person may transfer a claim, it does not follow that he may not contract other-
wise.12 The court reasoned that its holding was not violative of public policy' 8
because it found that the question of the free alienation of property was not in-
volved. What was involved was the plaintiff's contractual right to the money due the
contract. This right, stated the court, could not be separated from the other rights
and obligations of the contract; the right is limited by the obligations.
However not all jurisdictions are in agreement with the court's decision that the
assignor's right to the money due under the contract is merely a contractual one.
There is authority to support the proposition that money owed by a contract debtor
is property in the hands of the creditor of which the debtor cannot restrain the
alienation as between the creditor and a third party.14 It is submitted that the
reasoning of the instant case is a sounder approach to the problem involved. The
theory that the alienation of property cannot be effectively restrained contemplates
a transfer of property to one person and the control of its devolution in another. 15
Performance by a contracting party of his part of the contract does not ipso facto
vest a property right in him.16 Rather he has a contractual right17 which entitles him
to the performance by the other contracting party of his part of the contract or to
damages for the breach thereof. This right may not be the subject of an effective
assignment where the assignment is prohibited by the contract creating the right. 18
Further, while the right to assign a matured claim may be a fundamental right exist-
ing in the owner of the claim it does not necessarily follow that he may not curtail
such right by the very contract which gives rise to the claim.10
11. This statute provides that any claim or demand can be assigned with certain excep-
tions not here pertinent.
12. Contra: Bandes v. Triborough Bridge Authority, 165 Misc. 698, 703, 1 N. Y. S. 2d
921, 926 (N. Y. City Ct. 1936). See Sacks v. Neptune Meter Co., 144 Misc. 70, 81, 258
N. Y. Supp. 254, 267 (Sup. Ct. 1932) (concurring opinion).
13. For another holding to the effect that the clause in question is not violative of
public policy see Barringer v. Bes Line Construction Co., 23 Okla. 131, 99 Pac. 775 (1909).
14. Portuguese-American Bank v. Welles, 242 U. S. 7 (1916); State Street Furniture
Co. v. Armour & Co., 345 Ill. 160, 177 N. E. 702 (1931).
15. Continental Insurance Co. et al. v. New York and H. R. R. Co. et al., 187 N. Y. 225,
237, 79 N. E. 1026, 1029 (1907); De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N. Y. 467, 493 (1852) ; in re
Farmer's Will, 99 Misc. 437, 442, 163 N. Y. Supp. 1089, 1091 (1917).
16. See Costigan, The Doctrine of Boston Ice Company v. Potter, 7 COL. L. REv. 32,
36 (1907).
17. See Sacks & Neptune Meter Co., 144 Misc. 70, 76, 258 N. Y. Supp. 254, 261 (Sup.
Ct. 1932), aff'd, 238 App. Div. 82, 263 N. Y. Supp. 462 (1st Dep't 1933).
18. See Concrete Form Co. v. Grange Construction Co., 320 Pa. 205, 181 Atl. 589
(1935).
19. State ex rel. Kansas City Loan Guarantee Co. v. Kent, 98 Mo. App. 281, 282, 71
S. W. 1066, 1067 (1902).
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CONTRACTs-RESTRAINT OF TRADE-POWER OF COURTS TO REFOR SUCH Cor-
TRACS.-Defendant sold his wholesale fruit and vegetable business to the plaintiffs,
and as a part of the consideration agreed never to enter any kind of business in his
own name or with any other person in the County of Muhlenberg and State of
Kentucky. The defendant also conveyed to the plaintiffs a lease of the site of the
business for a ten year term with the right of renewal. Two years later, in violation
of the agreement, the defendant reentered the wholesale fruit and vegetable business
in the same city. In an action by the plaintiffs to enjoin the defendant from com-
peting with the plaintiffs, the Circuit Court found that the restrictions were too
broad, but enjoined the defendant from competing in Mfuhlenberg County until the
expiration of the plaintiffs' lease. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals held, two
justices dissenting, judgment affirmed. Ceresia v. Mitchell et al., 242 S. W. 2d 359
(Ky. 1951).
For the protection of one purchasing a business the courts have enforced restric-
tive covenants whereby the seller, as a part of the consideration, agrees not to
compete within a specified area and a specified period of time, providing the restric-
tions are reasonable.1 The reasonableness of the restraint depends upon whether it
affords a fair protection to the party in whose favor it is given and to the interests
of the general public.2 The covenant in the instant case is clearly unreasonable
inasmuch as it is unlimited as to time and excludes all types of businesses. In cases
where the covenants not to compete have been found unreasonable, the courts have
differed as to how far, if at all, they should be enforced.
Where a promise in restraint of trade is both unreasonable and indivisible, a
majority of the jurisdictions will not attempt to give it partial effect, but will let
the whole fall.4 The usual reason given is that where a promise is not clearly divisible,
a court cannot take out the objectionable parts since that would be making a new
contract for the parties. Another reason is that where the contract is indivisible
and partially unlawful, it is void since it is impossible for the court to determine
which part of the restraint induced the consideration.0
Most of the modem decisions trace their root to two English cases, Mallan et al.
1. Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U. S. 64 (1873); Diamond Match Co.
v. Roeber, 106 N. Y. 473, 13 N. E. 419 (1887); Smith's Appeal, 113 Pa. 579, 6 Ati. 251
(1886).
2. Roberts v. Lemont, 73 Neb. 365, 102 N. W. 770 (1905).
3. See note 1 supra.
4. Accord, S W rnsroN, CoNTAcTs § 1659 (rev. ed. 1936); RESTATF,=ET, Co,.nAcrS
§ 518 (1932). See also Capital Bakers, Inc. v. Leahy, 20 Del. Ch. 407, 178 At. 648 (1935);
Consumers' Oil Co. v. Nunnemaker, 142 Ind. 560, 41 N. E. 1048 (1895); Bucklew v.
Martens et ol., 108 N. J. L. 339, 156 AtL 436 (1931); Harris Calorific Co. v. Marra,
345 Pa. 464, 29 A. 2d 64 (1942); Herreshoff v. Boutineau, 17 R. L 3, 19 AtL 712 (1890);
Wisconsin Ice & Coal Co. v. Lueth et al., 213 Wis. 42, 250 N. W. 819 (1933). In Biet
et al. v. Biet, 135 Conn. 195, 63 A. 2d 161 (1948), the plaintiff made a promise which was
in unreasonable restraint of trade, and was permitted to succeed in his suit to have such
promise set aside. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the contract was an entirety
and that it could not be so divided by the court as to be enforced in one area and not
in another. The court concluded that had the parties desired narrower provisions, they
should have agreed upon them.
5.Emler v. Ferne, 23 Ohio App. 299, 155 N. E. 496 (1926). This court is one of the
few American courts which has adopted the English "blue-pencil" test, infra footnote 9.
6. Johnson v. McMillion et al., 178 Ky. 707, 199 S. W. 1070 (1918).
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v. May7 and Price v. Green s which held that the lawful parts of a divisible agree-
ment in restraint of trade or profession are enforceable while the other parts are
void. However, the divisibility must appear in the contract itself and is a question
of fact for the court. Thus, in the Price case, where a London and Westminister
perfumer on selling out agreed not to carry on the perfumer's trade in London or
Westminfster or within 600 miles of those places, the agreement was held divisible
as to the territory covered by the restriction and good as to London and West-
minister, though void as to the 600 mile zone. This case represents the law of
England today 9 and also the law of a majority of the American jurisdictions.10
Professor Williston criticizes the majority view by reasoning that if the lawful
parts of a divisible contract can be enforced, there is no reason why a contract
indivisible in terms cannot be enforced to the extent that it is legal."1 Professor
Corbin agrees, and further contends that partial enforcement of an indivisible con-
tract would involve much less of a variation from the effects intended by the parties
than total non-enforcement would.' 2 The majority of the court in the instant case
has adopted the views propounded by Professor Corbin, and has relied almost
wholly upon his work on contracts.' 3 This view has found favor in the courts of
Massachusetts' 4 and Kansas.15 Several states have enacted statutes which also tend
toward this view.' 6 Although the New York courts seem to be in accord with the
7. 11 M. & W. 653, i52 Eng. Rep. 967 (1843).
8. 16 M. & W. 346, 153 Eng. Rep. 1222 (1847).
9. Putsman v. Taylor, [1927] 1 K. B. 471; Attwood v. Lamont, [1920) 3 K. B. 571;
British Reinforced Concrete Engineering Co. v. Schelff, [1921] 2 Ch. 563. The English
courts have adopted a test of divisibility known as "blue-pencilling": if a blue pencil mark
can be drawn through the objectionable parts of a contract, the remainder will be enforced.
However, the divisible parts must be more than merely "grammatically severable."
10. See John T. Stanley Co. v. Lagomarsino, 53 F. 2d 112, 115 (S. D. N. Y. 1931),
where the court discusses the influence of the Price case.
11. 5 WIIxiSTON, CONTRACTS § 1660 (rev. ed. 1936).
12. 23 CONN. B. J. 43.
13. 6 CoBIrN, CONTRACTS § 1390 (1950).
14. Cedric G. Chase Photographic Laboratories, Inc. v. Hennessey et al., 97 N. E.
2d 397 (Mass. 1951); Metropolitan Ice Co. v. Ducas, 291 Mass. 403, 196 N. E. 856
(1935). In a recent Massachusetts case, similar to the instant case, the court reformed
a covenant which prohibited reentry into the bakery business for seven years within a
seven mile radius of Boston to four years within a four mile radius of Boston, holding
that an agreement involving unreasonable provisions was enforceable to the extent that It
was reasonable whether or not the agreement was by its terms divisible. Thomas et al v.
Paker, 98 N. E. 2d 640 (Mass. 1951).
15. Foltz v. Struxness, 168 Kan. 714, 215 P. 2d 133 (1950); Fox v. Barbee el al.,
94 Kan. 212, 146 Pac. 364 (1915). Also see Hill v. Central West Public Service Ice Co.,
37 F. 2d 451 (5th Cir. 1930). The area involved in this case was located in Texas; two
years later, in a similar case, the Texas court followed the majority rule. Martin v.
Hawley, 50 S. W. 2d 1105 (Tex. App. 1932). The Hill case was followed by John T.
Stanley v. Lagomarsino, supra note 10, in the second circuit. Both federal cases were
decided before Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
16. ArA. CODE tit. 9, §§ 22-4 (1940) ; CAL. Bus. & PaO. CODz §§ 16600-1 (Deering 1944);
N. D. REv. CODE tit. 9, c. 8, § 6 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 217-8 (1937); S. D.
CODE tit. 10, c. 7, § 5 (1939). These statutes are almost verbatim copies of the California
statute of 1872, and provide that every restraint of lawful business, trade or profession
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majority,17 several lower court decisions in recent years have followed the minority
rule.' 8
In the instant case, plaintiffs were induced into buying the business by the promised
restrictions. Should such restrictions be declared totally unenforceable, as they
would have probably been under the majority view, plaintiffs would have lost the
greater part of their consideration. However, by reforming the restraints, the major-
ity of the court in the instant case has made a contract for the parties into which
they never entered; something which most courts normally refuse to do. ° There
is no evidence whatever that the parties had ever agreed to the bargain which the
court made for them. The sounder view, and the view propounded by the majority
of the jurisdictions, is expressed by the dissent which holds that a court may reform
a contract where it is construing the true intent of the parties in cases of mutual
mistake or in cases of fraud by one party and mistake by the other, or, where a
contract is divisible, the court may cast out the wicked and enforce the good. But
beyond these limits, a court has no power to reform a contract. The criticism
commonly leveled at the divisibility rule of the majority is that it permits the one
in the stronger bargaining position to dictate the terms of the restraint, knowing
that the court will trim it to the legal maximum.20 However, this criticism applies
with equal force to the minority rule.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE AcT-IssUE or STOCK TO KEY EPLOYEES-PUBLTC OR
PRIVATE OaE.InIG.-Defendant corporation offered its stock to key employees:
those who were department heads, assistants to a department head, or other em-
ployees considered eligible for future promotion. Although the securities had not
been registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, defendant used the
mails to complete its plan. The offer was made to about 500 employees or about
5 to 8 per cent of the total number of employees. The plaintiff, Securities and
Exchange Commission, had obtained a temporary injunction restraining the sale as
violative of the Securities and Exchange Act in that it was alleged to be an offer of
unregistered securities through the mails. Thereupon the plaintiff moved to have
the injunction made permanent. Held, injunction denied on the ground that the
stock offering was a private offering and constituted a statutory exception to the
is void except that where the good will of a business is sold, an agreement not to compete
within a specified county, city or part thereof is valid and enforceable by the covenantee
and his assigns so long as the business continues in that area. It has been held that thee
statutes merely invalidate the excess even though there is only one agreement and it has
not been expressly divided by the parties. Wesley v. Chandler, 152 Okla. 22, 3 P. 2d 720
(1931).
17. Central N\ew York Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Averill et al., 199 N. Y. 128, 92 N. E. 206
(1910).
18. Goldstein v. Maisel, 271 App. Div. 971, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 410 (2d Dept. 1947);
Molina v. Barnay, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 124 (1945) (not officially reported); Schmidl v. Central
Laundry and Supply Co., 13 N. Y. S. 2d 817 (1939) (not officially reported); Widder
Dye and Chemical Co. et al. v. United States Marking Tag Co. et al. 241 App. Div. 703,
269 N. Y. S. 802 (2d Dept. 1934). The Schrmid and Molina cases involved employment
contracts with clauses not to compete after the termination of the employment.
19. Emler v. Ferne, supra note 5.
20. 5 Wnuso, CoNTRAcTs § 1660 (rev. ed. 1936).
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requirement that securities be registered. Securities & Exclange Cornm'n. v. Ralston
Purina Co., 102 F. Supp. 964 (E. D. Mo. 1952).
The sole question before the court was whether the transaction engaged in was a
public or private offering of stock.1 Nowhere in the statute is "public offering"
defined. In 1934 when the Securities Act was amended it was proposed to exempt
stock issues sold to employees of the issuer from the requirement that the securities
be registered. Both the House and the Senate rejected the proposal, the former on
the ground that employees were in need of the statute's protection, 2 and the latter
on the theory that employees were already without the section's prohibitions.3
The Securities and Exchange Commission itself has stated that the basis of deter-
mining whether or not an issue is public or private is determined by a number of
factors: (1) number of offerees; (2) their relation inter se and with the issuer;
(3) number of units of securities offered; (4) size of the offering; (5) manner in
which the offering is made; (6) likelihood of present or subsequent injury to the
public through an influx of unregistered speculative securities. 4 As in this case,
however, the Commission has consistently maintained the position that where there
is a substantial number of offerees the offering is a public one regardless of the
other factors and this interpretation has been seemingly approved by the courts.
In the instant case the court refused to base its decision on the number of
offerees involved but rather bottomed its conclusion upon the purpose of the de-
fendant in selecting the offerees and the circumstances of the offering. Hero the
court found that the purpose of the selection by the defendant was not an effort
to raise funds but rather to secure the loyalty of the key company personnel in
this manner, and that the circumstances surrounding the transaction showed good
faith on the part of the defendant corporation. 6
The court cited Securites & Exchange Comm'n. v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co.,
7
as authority for its decision. There in an appeal by the Securities and Exchange
Commission from an order denying a temporary injunction the sole question before
the court was whether an issue of securities confined to stockholders of the offering
corporation and to stockholders of another corporation whose assets the offering
corporation was seeking to acquire, constituted a private offering. In reversing the
1. Under 48 STAr. 77 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77e (1934), the use of the malls or inter-
state commerce, to offer or sell unregistered securities is prohibited. But by 48 STAr. 906
15 U. S. C. § 77d (1) (1934), the statute specifically exempts ". . . transactions by an
issuer not involving any public offering; . . ."
2. H. R. Rzx'. No. 1838, 73 Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934).
3. 78 CoNG. REc. 10182 (June 1, 1934).
4. Opinion of General Counsel of the Securities & Exchange Commission, Release 285,
January 24, 1935, 1 CCH FED. Szc. LAw REP. ff 2266.17 (1944). For other references dis-
cussing these elements see Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975, 977 (W. D. Pa. 1951);
Comment, 36 MicH. L. REV. 604, 609 (1938).
S. See Corporation Trust Co. v. Logan et al., 52 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (D. Del. 1943);
Note, 46 YALE L. J. 1071 (1937).
6. It is interesting to note that Professor Loss, who was counsel to the Commission
in the principal case, in his recent work, Sacuiarrms REGULATION 396 (1951), after citing
Securities and Exchange Comm'n. v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co. et al., 95 F. 2d 699 (9th
Cir. 1938) and Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975 (W. D. Pa. 1951) states that
an offering restricted to members of a class having special knowledge of the issuer, for
example, key executive employees, may be exempt, provided it meets the numbers test.
7. 95 F. 2d 699 (9th Cir. 1938).
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holding below the court held it might be a public offering and expressly refrained
from determining whether complete knowledge on the part of the subscriber would
alter the court's decision since the burden of proof of such knowledge was on the
company claiming the benefit of the exception for which the statute provides.
It would seem that although the test cited in the case at bar ws discussed in
the Sunbeam case, namely, whether or not there is a "sensible relation" between
the class of offerees selected and the purposes of the offering, it was merely set
forth as a general commentary on the problem and was not the actual grounds for
the decision in that case. However, the test appears to be sounder and more
workable than the arbitrary one of numbers suggested by the Commission.
On the assumption that the key employees of an offeror have sufficient knowledge
of the offeror's financial condition, the result reached in the principal case appears
to be sound, since in such a case the protective device of disclosure required by the
statute is unnecessary.8 However, a question may be raised as to the court's appar-
ent conclusion that all of the offerees, by virtue of their employment by the offeror,
possessed sufficient knowledge of its financial condition.
8. Dodd, Amending the Securities Act--The American Bar Association Commiltees'
Proposals, 45 YATIx L. T. 199, 205-8 (1935).
